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Outsourcing to the private sector is sometimes thought to be an effective way for 
politicians to shift blame. This paper presents four case studies of problems with 
large UK government contracts, it describes the strategies used by contracting 
parties to manage public blame and media coverage and financial market data are 
used to analyse the reputational and financial consequences of problems for the 
firms. Large outsourcers can be damaged by problems with public contracts and that 
damage is more than temporary, in the long run this will limits the scope for blame 
shifting. 
 
Keywords: Blame; contracting problems; G4S; outsourcing; public service 
conglomerates; Serco; share prices 
Impact: the analysis is relevant to practitioners and researchers who are interested in 
the strategic direction of outsourcing and government-market relations.  
 
Introduction 
Failures and misconduct in public service delivery can have important consequences 
for policy actors, hence the dynamics of blame and blame strategies have received a 
great deal of analysis (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002, 2007, 2011; Boin, Hart and 
McConnell, 2009). This paper explores examples of failure in the context of 
government outsourcing, where blame may reside with the buyer or with the supplier 
or may get lost between the two. Often, the ‘blame game’ is played out in public and 
so the strategies that players adopt can be observed, but it is more difficult to assess 
the costs that actors must bear for receiving blame. In exceptional circumstances, 
we have seen political resignations (Dewan and Dowding, 2005), occasionally we 
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have opinion poll data on an event and for major events it is plausible to look for 
electoral effects (Boin, Hart and McConnell, 2009). When policy delivery is delegated 
to companies, however, it is sometimes possible to assess the impact on suppliers 
when policy goes wrong. This paper analyses four examples of blame games in 
which businesses were major players and provides evidence of the impact on those 
firms’ valuations. 
  
Delegation of responsibility can have implications for blame avoidance strategies 
and the way the costs of failure are spread (Hood, 2011; Mortensen, 2016; 
Hinterleitner and Sager, 2016). Passing responsibility for a function to another 
organization might allow politicians to present public service failures as the result of 
failings on the part of an agency’s or corporation’s leadership. This outcome can 
appeal to politicians and government officials but what are the costs for the firm or 
agency? It might be that blame does little damage if the recipient is insulated from 
direct political pressures but, if receiving blame for public failings is costly, then 
organizations will be less willing to bid for contracts. Without an indicator of the 
damage caused to a firm, it is difficult to say whether outsourcing passes on the risks 
from public service provision or dissipates them. 
 
Outsourcing has been a key part of public management reforms internationally but it 
does raise questions of accountability (Mulgan, 2006; Alonso et al., 2015) especially 
in Britain where outsourcing has moved beyond easily contractible services into 
functions that are difficult to monitor (Wilks, 2013; Bovaird, 2016). There are many 
possible justifications for outsourcing government functions but, whatever the 
rationale, outsourcing is prone to change the dynamic of blame after a failure and 
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may create additional risks for both parties (Hood, 2011; Farneti and Young, 2008). 
Additional risks for politicians come from appointing a dysfunctional or opportunistic 
contractor, or a contractor that does not follow the cultural or ethical expectations of 
the public sector. Risks for firms come from a potentially unreliable client, from trying 
to deliver poorly-designed policy in an uncertain environment, and coping with 
heightened attention from media, parliament and interest groups. 
 
This paper analyses the development and impact of four, potentially ‘reputation 
damaging’ (Gatzert, 2015), public contracting problems involving two large 
companies in the UK. The problems included failure in the provision of service, 
breakdown in the relationship with government departments and alleged 
opportunistic behaviour. The blame dynamics following these problems are analysed 
and share price movements are used to provide an indication of the (perceived) 
costs to the supplier of the contracting problems.  
 
The events involved two companies that were heavily commercially exposed to the 
British state, even though they had international operations as well. Serco and G4S 
were both members of the FTSE 100 index during the events studied and were 
significant suppliers of a range of government functions (for further analysis see 
Bowman et al., 2015; Wilks, 2013; Crouch, 2003, 2011). Maintaining good relations 
with public officials and maintaining good reputations were crucial for their business 
models. As Paul Deighton (chief executive of London Organizing Committee of the 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games) put it when referring to G4S in the aftermath 




The government is their [G4S’] most important client. The eyes of the 
world are on this project. They were highly incentivised to succeed 
because of all those reasons (House of Commons, 2012, para. 34).  
 
Government contracting in the UK has faced severe strain over the last decade 
(some high profile problems since the 2015 election are found table 1). The system 
has witnessed failures in specific contracts as well as significant commercial 
challenges for large outsourcers which have put the approach in question. Arguably, 
the cases discussed in detail below were initial signs that something was going 
wrong in outsourcing (see Greasley, 2019 for a summary of problems in the wider 
system).  
Table 1 Selected post 2015 contracting problems 
Problem  Summary  
Rail contracting Failures in the franchising system leading to ‘root and branch’ 
Williams Review  
Army recruitment Persistent under recruitment of regular and reserve forces  
(NAO, 2018) 
Prison contracting Reversal of outsourcing of Birmingham prison (Brady 2019) 
Probation contracts Poor contract performance, financial instability of providers 
(Beard 2019)  
Carillion  Collapse of major supplier (and financial problems for others) 
(Mor et al 2019) 
   
The next section of this paper discusses related work in the blame game literature 
and the risks of public outsourcing are examined from the perspectives of both sides 
of the relationship. The empirical analysis is presented in two sections. The first 
presents accounts of how the events unfolded, the strategies of the actors involved 
and coverage in newspapers. The paper then turns to the effects of events on share 
prices and finds substantial revaluations of firms after the events and, with one 




The relationship between blame and delegation is revealed to be complex and 
interacts with other elements of the management of contractual relations. In two 
cases, government ministers amplified, perhaps partly manufactured, public blame. 
This is a powerful tool for the government, but unless used sparingly will start to 
affect the willingness of suppliers to bid for contracts. 
 
Related literature 
The analysis of blame in public policy has focused on politicians’ strategies for 
avoiding blame given their loss aversion and the perceived negativity bias of voters 
(Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002; Hood et al., 2009, 2016). Voters punish failure more 
enthusiastically than they reward success, and this bias is then passed (via media 
coverage) to politicians’ incentives who then select public responses to minimize 
their responsibility for publicly-observable failure. Alternatively, ‘anticipatory’ forms of 
blame avoidance attempt to ‘design away’ blame through delegation (as discussed in 
Hinterleitner and Sager, 2016). This is a common strategy across many countries: 
recent studies have analysed the effect of delegation on strategies for blame 
avoidance after natural disasters in the USA (Moynihan, 2012), the political fallout 
from mishandled public events in The Netherlands (Resodihardjo, van Eijk and 
Carroll, 2012; Resodihardjo et al., 2016), and the response to politically unpopular 
policy in Switzerland (Hinterleitner, 2017). Mortensen’s (2013) analysis of Norwegian 
health sector reorganization finds that less media blame was attributed to central 
authorities after decentralizing reforms and officials were less likely to try to pass 
responsibility up to politicians after the agencification of the Danish railways 




Public contracting is an example of what Hood (2010) calls ‘hard delegation’—an 
institutional design that inserts a formal contractual relationship between executive 
politicians and the organization which has operational responsibility for a function. 
Delegation can have two effects on blame (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2016): it can 
make it less likely that a problem is observed and it can affect the way that blame is 
managed if a problem is observed. The analysis in this paper focuses on the latter 
situation. The paper adds to the blame game literature’s focus on the effects of 
administrative structure by analysing blame when a function is contracted out and by 
assessing the reputational and financial consequences of contracting problems for 
private suppliers. These are important questions because the perceived riskiness of 
government work may influence the willingness of corporations to compete for 
tenders. On the other hand, if one of the effects of outsourcing functions is to 
dissipate the costs of blame after a problem emerges, then delegation can be an 
efficient mechanism for dealing with political risks. The blame-shift mechanism can 
work if the career incentives of private executives are not tightly linked to media and 
parliamentary assessment of performance. In short, if politicians can avoid blame by 
delegating to organizations whose leaders are not themselves subject to the 
pressures that create loss aversion, then the potential exists for a mutually 
advantageous exchange. Outsourcing will only make this possible, however, if 
corporations and their leaders are sufficiently insulated from the consequences of 





By inserting an institutional barrier between politicians and policy implementation, 
hard delegation helps to shift blame away from politicians, but it also leads to a loss 
of flexibility and control over delivery which can in turn generate new risks (Hood, 
2010). Typically, politically risky functions are complex and likely characterized by 
uncertainty and these features generate contracting as well as political risks (Brown 
et al., 2016). Contracting risks are associated with contract monitoring problems, 
opportunistic behaviour and disputes over how the terms of a contract should be 
interpreted. If such problems are serious, the relief from blame offered by delegation 
may only be temporary, politicians can again be open to blame for poorly-designed 
outsourcing and for failing to manage contractors. On the contractor side, working for 
the public sector can also introduce distinctive risks. These risks result partly from 
the public nature of the product provided and partly from the activities of extra-
contractual third parties, such as opposition politicians, who may try to direct and 
amplify blame and expand an issue when it emerges. Public contracting is also risky 
for business because the government is often a powerful customer and may be able 
to exploit public controversies to strengthen its position relative to suppliers. As 
Brändström and Kuipers (2003) point out, labelling an event ‘a failure’ is a political 
act and how an event evolves into a ‘public failure’ is often determined by politicians’ 
strategies.  
 
   
Figure 1, based on Hood et al. (2009) and Boin, Hart and McConnell (2009), is a 
schematic representation of the responses available for government and suppliers 
once an event is in the public domain. Government and suppliers can attempt to 
minimize or deny a problem; accept responsibility; or, try to pass responsibility on to 
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the other party. Third parties, in the current examples—parliamentarians, can try to 
allocate blame or credit to government and/or its contractors. The framework does 
not capture all the nuance of the cases, for example in two cases discussed in this 
paper the incumbent government sought to direct blame backwards towards 
predecessors, but it does provide a common structure on which to hang additional 
relevant detail.  
 






The examples studied here vary in intensity and media salience, but each occurred 
in a concentrated time period and entailed some potential reputational threat to 
government and to suppliers. The cases are not typical of contracting problems (or 
problems with policy implementation generally), which often involve chronic 
performance difficulties over extended periods and which rarely make much of a 
media splash. The atypical nature of the events is what makes them disruptive 
‘focusing events’ prone to generate blame and change and is why such events have 
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been analysed as distinctive types of failure in the public policy and management 
literature on blame (Moynihan, 2012). The sudden and unexpected nature of the 
events also allows for relatively confident estimation of changes in share prices.  
 
Four outsourcing failures: Serco and G4S 
The two companies that were involved in the cases, Serco and G4S, were strategic 
suppliers of services to the British government and they were also commercially 
exposed to the government as a customer. The National Audit Office estimated that 
approximately 10% of G4S revenues for 2012 came from the British public sector 
and the equivalent figure for Serco was around a third (NAO, 2013). G4S 
concentrated on immigration and law and order functions; Serco was more 
diversified with interests in defence, transport, health, law and order and energy. For 
each company there was a risk that failures in one contract might generate spill-over 
costs by damaging its relationship with government and its broader reputation. The 
four examples of outsourcing failures are outlined below. 
  
Example 1: Demands for more money 
In 2010, the UK’s new Coalition government attempted to renegotiate contracts with 
its major suppliers as part of its austerity drive. The Conservatives had committed to 
supporting small- and medium-sized businesses in the market for public services 
and consequently government sought assurances from major suppliers that any 
renegotiated rebate would not be passed down to the companies’ own supply chain. 
In the autumn, a newspaper story revealed that Serco had sent a letter demanding a 
2.5% rebate from its larger suppliers and had intimated that future business was at 
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stake (Tyler, 2010). The Cabinet Office criticized the company and, after briefly 
prevaricating, Serco withdrew the letter and an apology was issued. The hostile 
reaction of the government changed a minor news story into a more significant risk 
for the company. Two elements of the letter were particularly damaging: the fact that 
the company was accused of reneging on an agreement with the Cabinet Office and 
the way the letter linked the company’s demand for a rebate to the government’s 
austerity policies. The context of the row generated favourable press coverage for 
the Cabinet Office, which was seen to be seeking to save taxpayers’ money, by 
‘taking on’ large corporations while ensuring those corporations did not ‘bully’ 
suppliers. A small number of press articles framed the events differently, as an 
unwarranted intervention into a private business’ management of its supply chain in 
response to a common business strategy.  
  
Example 2: Olympic delivery failure 
The second example is a case of delivery failure. G4S had won the contract to 
manage venue security at the 2012 Olympic Games in Britain and had agreed to 
provide 10,400 staff and manage 13,000 further personnel (these numbers were a 
result of a renegotiation at the end of 2011 which had substantially increased the 
requirements). Two weeks before the opening ceremony, G4S told LOCOG, the 
Olympic Games organizers, that it would not be able to provide the agreed numbers. 
The government’s contingency plan was triggered on 12 July and the Home 
Secretary answered an emergency question in the House of Commons about the 
need for additional military personnel. After the contingency plan was put in place, 
journalists started to publish articles about the company’s growing administrative, 
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scheduling and recruitment problems and the story received intensive media 
attention until the opening ceremony. The government refrained from publicly 
criticising the company during the run up to the Olympic Games, although its rhetoric 
became harsher when the question of compensation for the cost of the contingency 
plan became an issue. The G4S chief executive’s appearance at a parliamentary 
hearing, and his insistence that the company would retain its management fee, 
sustained the story and triggered further negative comment. In parliament, 
opposition MPs tried to focus the blame on the Home Office, challenging its story 
about when it knew of problems and its monitoring of the contract. There were also 
attempts by Labour to expand the issue by questioning the move towards police 
outsourcing which was already controversial and would likely lead to a sizeable role 
for G4S. The Olympic Games passed off without a major security incident and press 
interest faded. 
 
Example 3: Overcharging 
Example 3 involves accusations of overcharging for services. Both G4S and Serco 
held contracts to monitor prisoners who were wearing electronic tags. The 
companies charged on a per-offender-day basis for monitoring compliance with 
curfew conditions. In early 2013, officials identified billing anomalies and in May of 
that year auditors were asked to examine the companies’ billing practices. The 
audits found that, since the mid 2000s, the companies had been charging for 
monitoring some offenders after they had left the scheme and for some who had not 
been tagged (NAO, 2013b). The Secretary of State for Justice demanded the 
companies co-operate with a forensic audit of all their major public contracts and 
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withdraw from the competition for the renewal of the tagging contract. Serco 
acquiesced but G4S refused both demands and its contract was referred to the 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO). The Secretary of State for Justice also noted that the 
contracts were signed and the overcharging started under the previous government. 
The overcharging was partly due to an administrative failure by the courts to provide 
notification when offenders left the scheme and it was also revealed that officials had 
been aware of some of the practices in 2008. In an NAO (2013b) report G4S 
provided examples of having requested (without success) that the courts provide the 
required notifications. G4S received more attention in the press than Serco partly 
because of its higher profile and because of its uncooperative response. There were 
two potential interpretations of events, in one version overcharging was the result of 
opportunism or due to a failure to adequately control managers. The other version 
was that the overcharging resulted from poor administration on both sides, the sort of 
problem that would normally be dealt with by negotiation between the contracting 
parties. Press coverage and the debate in parliament favoured the first version. In 
the autumn, Serco’s contract was also passed to the SFO for investigation and 
eventually both companies agreed to pay compensation.  
 
Example 4: Misreporting performance 
The fourth example followed soon after the third and related to alleged misreporting 
of performance data on Serco’s Prisoner Escort and Custodial Services (PECS) 
contract. The allegation was passed to the police in August 2013. The accusation 
was interpreted by the Secretary of State for Justice as further evidence of 
systematic problems with Serco’s culture—the previous week he had demanded in a 
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newspaper interview that the Serco and G4S ‘purge’ themselves and undergo a 
process of ‘corporate renewal’ (Warrell, 2013). The problems were also portrayed in 
the press as indicative of underlying issues with corporate governance at Serco. 
That interpretation was implicitly accepted by Serco’s chief executive agreeing that 
corporate renewal was required (Leftly, 2013). The police investigation of the 
contract was halted in 2014 having found no evidence of criminal behaviour.  
 
Comparing contract failures 
The four examples are summarised and contrasted in Table 1. In example 1, once 
the letter demanding a rebate was revealed, the government chose to add to the 
pressure on its supplier. This reaction may have been shaped by the perception that 
the company had reneged on an agreement with the Cabinet Office and by 
complaints from the Federation of Small Businesses—an important interest group. The 
story also developed in the context of government contract renegotiations with Serco 
and across the whole range of major suppliers. Example 2, the Olympic Games 
security contract, was the only straightforward ‘delivery failure’ and it occurred in a 
high-profile context. In this case, the government did not overtly join the criticism of 
the company. In the final two examples, government strategy was to amplify blame 






Table 2. Four contracting failures. 














Events 31 Oct Serco letter 
leaked 
1 Nov Serco letter 
withdrawn 
11 Jul 
Contingency plan  
17 Jul Select 
committee 
hearing  
11 Jul Results of audit, 
G4S referred to SFO, 
Serco accept ‘forensic 
audit’  
28 Aug PECS (Serco) 

















on Serco’s letter) 
‘under-hand tactic’ 
‘government was 












G4S don't fulfil 
their contract we 
will go after them 





regrets that…it is 
unlikely to deliver 
in full its 
obligations’  
 
Third parties: ‘G4S 
has let the 
country down and 
you have had to 







Government: ‘I am 
angry at what has 
happened and am 
determined to put it 
right’.  
‘I am also 
disappointed that G4S 
still feels it 
appropriate to 
participate in the 
tendering process for 
the next generation of 
electronic monitoring 
contracts’ (Secretary 
of State for Justice)  
 
Suppliers: ‘have always 
billed in line with the 
contract’. 
‘taken out of all 
proportion’ 
Third parties: ‘To the 
lay public, that 
appears to be 
straightforward 
fraud…serious failings 
have been exposed in 
the way the MOJ buys 
in hundreds of millions 
of pounds of services, 
the Justice Secretary is 
proposing a massive 
expansion in the 
amount of work 




become clear there 
has been a culture 
within parts of 
Serco that has been 
unacceptable’ 
(Secretary of State 










Sources: Print media database, Hansard. 
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The companies adopted various responses to the events. In the rebate example, 
Serco did not immediately grasp the political nature of the situation and had to 
rapidly reverse its position after initially declining to withdraw the demand for a 
rebate. During the Olympic Games problems, G4S went along with the government 
line and only occasionally raised questions about, for example, the preparedness of 
LOCOG—the Olympic Games organizing committee. In the final two examples 
Serco did not challenge the framing of the government and after some initial 
resistance G4S complied with the requirement to withdraw from the competition for 
the new tagging contract. The difference in strategies may have reflected the 
recognition that G4S depended less on government business than did Serco. 
 
Parliament played its most important role in the Olympics Games example where the 
select committee appearance of G4S’ chief executive had an impact on news 
coverage. The Home Secretary faced antagonistic questioning from opposition MPs 
in parliament but blame for the problems was largely laid at the G4S’ feet. The 
contract failures were also used as opportunities to challenge other elements of the 
government’s outsourcing strategy. In particular, after the Olympics problems MPs 
focused on police outsourcing and the overcharging problems were used by Labour 









Figure 2. Media reputation after four contracting problems. 
 
 
In Figures 2a–2d, press coverage is used as an indicator of reputational damage. 
Reputation was a common theme in the coverage of events and was often presented 
as more important than the financial consequences of failures. An indicator of 
reputational damage was constructed by coding newspaper articles, accessed 
through the Lexis Nexis database, that referred to the companies. The author and  
research assistants then coded the articles for their ‘sentiment’ towards the named 
companies using an 11 point scale, and where there was disagreement the average 
was taken. The indicator tries to capture an article’s general assessment of a firm, 
rather than directly measuring attribution of responsibility for a specific event. The 
data in the graphs are daily aggregates of article sentiment and so the reputation 
effect is a combination of salience (the number of articles on a day) and sentiment 
(average sentiment of the day’s articles). The titles used were the Mail, the 
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The rebate dispute was short-lived (Figure 2a) and the most intense negative 
coverage was on the day after the company had reversed its position, as 
commentators speculated about the consequences for the company’s relationship 
with government. The Olympic security contract was the most high profile of the 
cases and negative attention was sustained for two weeks. The first spike in 
negative coverage in Figure 2b corresponds to the initial news that the contingency 
plan had been triggered by the Home Office, the media’s interest was then revived 
by the chief executive’s select committee appearance, the final spike coincides with 
the weekend newspapers publishing overview articles about the security contract 
and articles which included comment on the prospects and competency of the firm. 
The coverage spread beyond the details of Olympics security into examination of 
company strategy, profiles of executives’ careers and other negative events. Figure 
2c shows the coverage of both companies in July 2013 after the results of the audit 
of the electronic monitoring contract were revealed. The coverage for the firms was 
similar until the unco-operative response of G4S (dashed line) to the government’s 
demands, which led to further negative coverage for the company compared to 
Serco (unbroken line). Finally, the prisoner contract story in August was focused on 
Serco this received the least attention (Figure 2d). The lack of the coverage may 
have been influenced by the timing of the event, the August announcement was 
during parliamentary recess and there was limited immediate reaction from 
opposition politicians. 
 
Two features of the events particularly relate to the previous literature on blame in 
public policy. The first is that actors need to be concerned about their reputations 
beyond the immediate policy context (Moynihan, 2012). This is especially so for 
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these two companies both of which relied on multiple contracts with government. 
The second is that policy ‘failures’ such as these examples are always the results of 
political framing processes rather than being straightforward and unmediated factual 
accounts (Stone, 1989). The intensity of media interest during an event was often 
influenced by government ministers’ statements and especially so for examples 1 
and 3. 
 
Analysing share price movements 
It is often difficult to assess the damage to organisations caused by failures in the 
public sector—a lot of different factors are at play and negative consequences can 
often occur some period after the event that is said to have created them. The 
negative press coverage suffered by the firms is an indicator that contract failure in 
public services generates reputational damage. It would be ideal to have an indicator 
with a closer and direct relation to a company’s interests. In this section movements 
in company share prices are used to indicate the perceived costs to firms of the 
adverse events relating to their public contracts. A simple event study method is 
employed, this involves comparing the returns on the target stock with the returns on 
a measure of the broader market in a period around the day of an adverse event. 
Here, the FTSE 100 index is used as the comparator. If the event is unexpected, 
then unusual price movements of the target stock (relative to the broader market 
price) immediately after a negative event occurs is an indication of investor’s 





The first step is to calculate the individual stock returns and the market returns for an 
‘estimation period’, which in this case ends seven days prior to the event occurring. 
Daily returns are calculated as the proportional change in price over a day’s trading 
for each company and for the FTSE 100 (as in equations 1a and 1b). Where 𝑝𝑡
𝑐 is 
the price at time 𝑡 of the company stock, and 𝑟𝑡
𝑐 the daily return on the company 
stock, and 𝑝𝑡
𝑚 and 𝑟𝑡
𝑚 are the equivalents for the market aggregate (FTSE 100 
index). The relationship between the target stock returns and the market returns 
during an estimation period is then estimated using OLS (equation 2): 
  
𝑟𝑡
𝑐 =  
𝑝𝑡
𝑐 −  𝑝𝑡−1
𝑐
𝑝𝑡
𝑐  (1𝑎)  
𝑟𝑡
𝑚 =  
𝑝𝑡
𝑚 −  𝑝𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑝𝑡
𝑚  (1𝑏)  
 𝑟𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑎 +  𝑏. 𝑟𝑡
𝑚 +  𝜀𝑡, (𝑑 − (𝑛 + 7) < 𝑡 < 𝑑 − 7) (2) 
  
The goal of the analysis is to identify unusual movements in the price of the target 
stock during an ‘event window’—a period of trading days including the date of the 
event being analysed. ‘Unusual’ here means movement in the company stock which 
cannot be explained by general movements in the market or the usual variability of 
the stock. To achieve this goal the parameter estimates from Equation 2 (?̂? and ?̂?) 
are used along with the observed returns of the FTSE 100 during the event window 
to construct an expected return for the company, ?̂?𝑡
𝑐. This is the ‘market model’ of the 
stock returns during the event window (equation 3). Excess returns, 𝑥𝑟𝑡
𝑐, are then 
calculated as the difference between actual company stock returns during the event 





𝑐 = ?̂? +  ?̂?. 𝑟𝑡
𝑚, (𝑑 − 7 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑑 + 24) (3)  
 
𝑥𝑟𝑡
𝑐 =  𝑟𝑡
𝑐− ?̂?𝑡
𝑐 , (𝑑 − 7 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑑 + 24) (4) 
 
Excess returns measure how unusual the movement of a stock price is given how 
the market moved on the same day. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
abnormal returns summed over multiple days after an event has occurred at time d 
and can indicate whether the initial share revaluation after an adverse event persists 
beyond the immediate period or whether there is a reversion (MacKinlay 1997, p. 
21).  
 
The events are single-firm, single-event studies and so the usual methods of 
statistical inference are unreliable. Gelbach, Helland and Klick’s (2013) non-
parametric ‘sample quantile’ test is used to conduct significance tests. The 
procedure involves identifying the rank position of abnormal returns of interest in the 
distribution of the estimation period residuals. If the event’s abnormal return is in the 
bottom 5% of the distribution, then the null hypothesis of no effect is rejected at the 
5% level (for a one-tailed test). Gelbach et al. (2013) show that this method provides 
consistent estimate of the critical value of a 5% significance test in single event, 
single firm event studies without relying on distributional assumptions. The method 
does not produce standard errors and so cannot be used to construct confidence 
intervals.  
 




It is easiest to understand the results of the analysis by consulting the graphs of 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns (the graphs show ARs and CARs for the 
day of the event and 24 further trading days, tables report the first five days). Figure 
3a displays share movements around the Serco rebate example. The upper graph of 
each panel is the daily abnormal returns in the event window and the lower graph the 
cumulative abnormal returns, which start on the day of the event. The first trading 
day (Monday 1 November) after the initial newspaper report is treated as the event 
day. Serco’s stock lost 4.5% and 4% on the first and second day after the letter was 
published compared to what would have been expected using a market model (both 
are statistically significant at a 5% level using a one-tailed test). Although there was 
some recovery on the fourth day, the losses were sustained over the remaining days 
of the event window with the company stock price approximately 9% lower against 
the counterfactual.  
Figure 3b displays the abnormal returns after G4S’s Olympics security problems. (A 
dummy variable was added to the estimation period model in October 2011 to 
account for share movements after announcement of merger plans.) There was little 
reaction on the day the contingency plan was announced and thereafter there were 
small declines in price until after the weekend of 14–15 July 2012 when there were 
substantial price falls of almost 9% on 16 July and a further 5.5% the following day 
(when the chief executive appeared at the select committee). The CARs were minus 













Figure 4a displays the price responses to the July 2013 announcement of allegations 
of overcharging. This event involved both Serco (solid line) and G4S (dotted line). 
The estimation periods for these events ran from 27 July 2012 to 2 July 2013. (A 
dummy variable was added to the G4S model to account for the effect of a profit 
warning on 7 May 2013). 
Two potentially confounding events occurred on 10 July 2013, the day before the 
event analysed here. A coroner’s court ruled that a deportee in G4S’ care had been 
unlawfully killed (the death occurred in 2010) and also the parliamentary Public 
Accounts Committee published a report criticising the running of a Serco regional 
health service contract. Both of these potentially confounding stories had been in the 
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confident that abnormal returns are solely the results of the focal events studied 
here.  




Both companies experienced large drops in their share prices on 11 July 2013: G4S 
lost 6% against the market counterfactual, and Serco lost over 8%. While G4S’s 
stock regained the lost value over the following days, for Serco the CARs remained 
around minus 10% for the rest of the event window.  
 
The final event was the 28 August 2013 announcement that Serco’s PECs contract 
would be investigated by the police. This is shown in Figure 4b. The same estimation 
period used for Serco in analysing the July 2013 event was also used to analyse the 
28 August announcement. This was to ensure that the baseline model would not be 
contaminated by the previous tagging announcements. Serco’s shares did not move 
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expected from the baseline model on the day after the announcement and, although 
there was some reversion the next day, the cumulative abnormal return settled 
around minus 9%. Table 2 shows the excess returns and the results of the statistical 
tests for each example. Each of the events was followed by substantial stock price 
revaluations and, in all but one case, the decline was sustained over more than a 
month of trading days. The exception was the July 2013 (tagging) announcement 
relating to G4S, which did initially lead to a fall in value but over time the stock price 
recovered.  


















     
t = 0 -4.65%* 0.47% -6.03%* -8.42%* -0.4% 
t = +1 -4.34%* -1.98% -1.69% -1.00% -11.90%* 
t = +2 -0.87% -2.33%* -1.43% 0.13% 2.50%* 
t  = +3 -1.25% -8.71%* 2.65% 0.48% -1.14% 
t  = +4  2.14% -5.45%* 0.61% -0.85% 0.88% 
*p < 0.05  





     
C[0] -4.65% 0.47% -6.03% -8.42% -0.04% 
C[0,1] -9.00% -1.51% -7.72% -9.42% -12.26% 
C[0,2] -9.87% -3.84% -9.15% -9.28% -9.79% 
C[0,3] -11.12% -12.56% -6.49% -8.80% -10.93% 





The cases studied here are examples where delegation to the private sector did not 
dissipate the cost of blame and it appears to have created risks on all sides of the 
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contractual relationship. As with other blame game studies, the cases are selected to 
be relatively high profile. Consequently, these cases do not necessarily generalize to 
the more typical low-key risks faced by contractors. Instead, they are disruptive 
events which have the potential to change a system and do significant damage to 
actors’ interests. The goal of the analysis here was to unpick the process of how 
blame games play out and the consequences that follow for the companies involved.  
 
Mostly the stock prices behaved as expected, but the comparative response of G4S 
and Serco shares to the July 2013 tagging announcement is an anomaly. The news 
seemed to be worse for G4S but Serco’s shares did not recover in the way that 
G4S’s did. This can be rationalized in various ways, for example, the tagging 
announcement came after a period of bad news for G4S, including a failed merger 
attempt, the Olympics problems, loss of prison contracts and a profit warning. G4S 
had new leadership and the problems of the previous year could be presented as 
due to the previous team. 
 
On the government side, hard delegation may have helped ministers to avoid 
immediate blame for problems, but it came at the price of a loss of control over 
delivery (Hood, 2011). Ministers had to address the problematic performance of the 
contractors and faced the risk of it being reflected back at them, through questions 
about the competence of their contract management and about the wisdom of their 
outsourcing plans. Ministers demonstrated that they were willing to make events into 
high-salience news stories rather than try to contain events and limit public attention, 
presumably because they were confident that blame would be targeted at the 
supplier. The supplier rebate story would not have received the attention it did 
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without the Cabinet Office’s public criticisms of the company which were made in the 
context of attempts to renegotiate government contracts with Serco and other 
suppliers. Government ministers were also willing to magnify blame in the tagging 
events, or at least some media commentators believed that the government had 
taken an unnecessarily public approach to the dispute. This supports the idea of 
Brändström and Kuipers (2003) that the process which turns ‘events’ into ‘failures’ 
often has a political nature.  
 
Opposition politicians and other third parties were sometimes able to influence the 
framing of events and to add to the pressure on outsourcing companies. The select 
committee hearing held during the Olympic event is the clearest example of this, it 
appears to have re-energized media coverage. Opposition MPs had some success 
at expanding individual contracting problems into broader questions about 
companies’ competence and the outsourcing system. For example, the link was 
made in a select committee report on the Olympics published later in 2012:  
 
Perhaps the most significant area of public concern flows from the growing 
role that G4S plays in the criminal justice system, and in public contracts more 
widely (House of Commons, 2012, para. 5) 
 
The companies were vulnerable because of their multiple public contracts and 
because their business models relied on future public contracts (less so for G4S). 
This helps to explain the substantial share revaluations which followed after each of 
the events and in most cases persisted. Reflecting on the events of 2013 in the 
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company’s annual report, Serco’s chair noted that the ‘inevitable consequence has 
been a material loss of momentum, particularly in the UK’ (Serco, 2013, p. 1).  
 
The risk to future government business would have been a key concern for these 
contractors and was also picked up by the media. The commercial costs of a failure 
were not limited to the specific contract but may also have affected ongoing relations 
with government, the reputations of outsourcers with other potential clients and the 
broader political environment in which the outsourcers operated (Moynihan, 2012). 
The government made clear that the firms should not bid for the 2014 probation 
outsourcing contracts and other outsourcing business was also lost (for example a 
large defence equipment outsourcing project was abandoned in late 2013). 
Executives also faced individual risks with resignations following G4S’s Olympics 
contract and after Serco’s tagging problems. 
  
Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the academic literature on blame allocation by analysing 
four examples of contract problems involving two large private suppliers to the British 
government. In the cases studied, blame was not dissipated by delegation and there 
is good reason to think that the high level of exposure of the firms to government 
amplified the costs of failure, the events reveal that commercial risks of blame can 
be significant for companies operating in public services. One feature of the cases 
studied here was the willingness of minsters to proactively use blame and adopt 
strategies which damaged commercial reputations when disputes arose in their 




If corporations bear significant costs after problems, then the scope for blame 
shifting through outsourcing is limited. Businesses which may be subject to blame 
will have the same risk aversion incentives that delegating to a politically sheltered 
organization is said to remove. If politicians have shown themselves willing to amplify 
blame, and if this in turn damages suppliers’ business models, then we should 
expect fewer suppliers participating in the markets for public contracts. This is an 
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